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Abstract: The rise to power of movement-based parties is a new and expanding phenomenon. 
Existing theories predict these parties will become increasingly oligarchic as they govern 
nationally. The Bolivian MAS deviates from this conventional wisdom, as it has followed a 
remarkably different organizational trajectory that has facilitated grassroots impact and 
constrained elite control. Through a within-case comparative examination of MAS, this paper 
identifies necessary conditions and explains mechanisms facilitating this outcome in the crucial 
area of candidate selection. Key to understanding how these parties operate is the organizational 
context in which they are embedded. Where civil society is strong, has mechanisms to arrive at 
decisions, and can agree on candidate selection, it can play an important role in resisting the 
oligarchization of allied movement-based parties.  
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Political parties have undergone deep changes in recent years. As mass partisanship has 
increasingly become a relic of the past, parties founded to sustain support for a single charismatic 
leader have become common – prominent examples include the United Socialist Party of 
Venezuela under Chávez, and the Italian Forza Italia under Berlusconi. In these parties, the 
locus of organizational power is squarely at the top. By contrast, other newer parties, like the 
Green “movement parties” in Europe, reject personalism in the interest of boosting participation 
and resisting oligarchic pressures. However, success in achieving and maintaining internal 
grassroots participation, particularly after assuming national power, has generally proven to be 
elusive.1  
New parties have been particularly important in Latin America.2 One of the most salient 
developments in the region is the emergence and access to power of left parties representing the 
interests of the politically and socially marginalized.3 Usually described as movement-based 
parties (MBPs),4 they draw their organizational strength from connections to grassroots social 
movements, like the Brazilian PT (Workers’ Party), the Uruguayan FA (Broad Front), and the 
Bolivian MAS (Movement Toward Socialism). MBPs are not just a Latin American 
phenomenon; they are also emerging in Africa, the Middle East, Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe, and North America.5 Despite their increasing importance, we know little about how 
these parties work. Research has tended to focus on the origins of MBPs,6 but their internal 
politics remain both under-examined and under-theorized.  
In Latin America, the ascension of MBPs to national-level power generated some 
optimism about the prospects for building internally democratic organizations that encourage 
wide and substantive participation of organized civil society in decision-making. Extending 
direct grassroots participation, which has been associated with the post-Cold War notion of 
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“deepening” democracy, is a historic goal of the left in Latin America.7 Scholars have shown that 
new left parties and political movements in power in Latin America vary in the extent to which 
their internal structures disperse authority,8 but a fundamental question still remains unanswered: 
What are the sources of variation between and within parties?  
This question has a long lineage. It goes as far back as Michels’s oligarchy theory, which, 
in its short version, predicts the inevitable rise of elite-dominated hierarchical structures that 
concentrate power and de-emphasize bottom-up participation in procedures of social choice.9 
Michels’s theory is the argument influential analyses of party organization either explicitly 
confront or confirm.10 Framed as a “fundamental sociological law of political parties,” it denies 
the very possibility of democratic modes of governance within parties – particularly as they 
contest elections and access power. The idea of internal party democracy has regained attention 
in the comparative study of political parties, partly in response to the almost-universal crises of 
representation and the decline of mass party membership.11 But, under what conditions can 
parties escape a seemingly inevitable oligarchic fate?  
This question is important for substantive and theoretical reasons. Substantively, parties 
are crucial for democracy; they are key for political interest aggregation and the translation of 
programs into policies. Their internal structures have implications not only for inter-party 
competition, but also for shaping public policy outcomes. For example, more internally 
democratic parties generally push policy in a more redistributive and universalistic direction.12 
Thus, there is a potentially high payoff for research on the sources of variation in the internal 
distribution of power within and between parties.  
Theoretically, understanding the internal life of an increasingly common phenomenon 
like MBPs adds to one of the most strikingly under-developed literatures in comparative politics: 
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the debate about what happens inside the “black box” of parties.13 Even though parties remain 
weakly organized in much of the developing world, the era of party building is far from over and 
MBPs are well equipped to build strong organizations.14 We need to understand how they work. 
Current research focuses mostly on the conditions giving rise to strong parties.15 The 
question of whether and how parties can defy oligarchization has received less attention. When 
democracy within parties is deficient, particularly when these are in power, the voices of citizens 
may not be heard. When governing parties are democratically organized, by contrast, they may 
generate opportunities for the empowerment of traditionally marginal groups and individuals.16 
Arguments about party democracy are arguments about “democratizing” democracy. The goal 
here is to explain with original, systematic evidence the conditions and mechanisms under which 
broader and more substantive grassroots participation might be promoted in contemporary 
governing parties.17  
This article uses a within-case research design for theory-building purposes. Specifically, 
it explains variation in patterns of legislative candidate selection within the case of the Bolivian 
MAS. The value of this approach is twofold. First, the selection of candidates is a central aspect 
of internal party democracy; its examination reveals critically important information about how 
parties are organized and how power is allocated within them.18 The selection of legislative 
candidates is the best point from which to study power struggles within parties because they 
generally involve a broader set of actors and processes than, say, executive elections.19 To 
develop a fuller measure of levels of grassroots influence, elsewhere I examine the degree to 
which greater grassroots control over the selection of candidates also translates into greater 
substantive input over party policy. I find that the stronger and most influential organizations that 
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wield power over candidate selection are also important in the policy-making realm, but this 
varies by policy area.20 
Second, MAS is one of the most successful new MBPs in power in Latin America, and 
yet the case deviates from the conventional wisdom on this type of party: defying theoretical 
expectations, it has followed an organizational trajectory that has facilitated grassroots impact 
and constrained elite control, even after assuming power at the national level.21 Conventional 
accounts of these parties focus on cases that develop a strong organizational infrastructure of 
collective action before assuming national power, such as the Brazilian PT.22 Consequently, their 
conclusions tend to emphasize the “normalization” of these parties, and the difficulties of 
sustaining bottom-up participation when they govern at the national level.23 As a deviant case, 
studying MAS serves to advance theory by identifying the conditions in its structure that work 
against oligarchy, and explaining the mechanisms that make internal responses to the grassroots 
possible.24 The scope conditions of this study are restricted to MBPs that (a) assume power 
rapidly and that (b) operate in weakly institutionalized contexts.  
Concretely, this article identifies necessary conditions and mechanisms that provide 
opportunities for broad participation and substantive grassroots impact on candidate selection 
procedures: namely, the presence of strong grassroots organizations that can agree on selection. 
When such organizations are either absent or unable to agree on selection, elite decision-making 
is more likely to occur. Thus, I argue, where civil society is strong and united it can play an 
important role in affecting internal party governance and help impede the oligarchization of 
allied parties.  
This article contributes new theory and empirical findings to debates among scholars of 
party organization in Latin America and beyond. The literature on parties is dominated by 
 6 
Downsian, rational choice approaches that see parties as unitary actors detached from their social 
bases.25 However, sociological and comparative historical approaches have shown that parties 
are not unitary actors dominated by a unified leadership.26 I present new data demonstrating that 
just as parties operate differently in different localities in how they organize their electoral 
appeals to different social bases,27 they also work differently in the realm of candidate selection 
depending on the structuring of the political space in which they operate. Although there is a 
significant amount of new literature on party electoral strategy, 28  scholars have largely 
overlooked the critical question of how party-civil society relations shape parties and their 
internal politics. I show that these relationships vary across geographical constituencies, and that 
this has meaningful impact on party politics. 
 
MOVEMENT-BASED PARTIES: EXPLAINING THEIR INTERNAL POLITICS 
Institutional and structural factors interact to shape candidate selection. Institutional 
elements include aspects of a country’s electoral system and elements related to the strength of 
the local party apparatus. Structural factors correspond to the organizational strength of civil 
society. Strongly organized societies, as the empirical literature shows, serve as a potential power 
base for parties. They can play not only an important party-building role, but can also shape 
internal party governance.  
 
Movement-Based Parties (MBPs) 
MBPs are parties with a core constituency of grassroots social movements. This 
definition parallels Levitsky’s definition of labor-based parties, with social movements rather 
than labor as the core constituency.29 MBPs are also different from Kitschelt’s analytical 
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characterization of “movement parties,” which are almost always electoral vehicles for a social 
movement mobilized around a single issue.30 By contrast, movement-based parties are broader 
alliances of various movements and, as such, they are better prepared to incorporate a broader set 
of issues, actors, and demands.  
MBPs follow the “organic” model of party development, in that they are organizationally 
hybrid: they engage in extra-institutional social mobilization, and at the same time compete for 
office. Members and leaders who run for electoral office tend to be “drawn directly from social 
movements rather than from the ranks of a separate, professional political caste.” 31 While these 
parties vary in terms of ideology,32 they almost always share a rejection of hierarchical control as 
well as an explicit commitment to maximizing democratic participation at the grassroots.  
MBPs are often seen as “transitional phenomena,”33 but the “into what” question is not 
settled. One salient argument suggests that the more participatory, “bottom-up” decision-making 
patterns that are generally present early in the life of an MBP are only viable for a short time. 
However, MBPs may not evolve in a unilinear way. It is also theoretically plausible that such 
parties follow contingent structural and strategic incentives that allow for a return to 
organizational patterns common in early phases. In short, there are no a priori reasons that 
parties based on movements will transition to a form of party that is hierarchical, exclusive, and 
centralized. Their genesis in grassroots mobilization and their hybrid nature may encourage 
democratic control from below. The realization of this potential depends on the organizational 
strength and unity of allied movements.  
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Institutional Elements 
My analysis focuses on two institutional elements – electoral rules and the nature of the 
local party organization. Electoral systems affect candidate selection by creating space for civil 
society actors to shape the process.34 Mixed-member proportional electoral systems (MMPs), 
like the one used in Bolivia, force parties to produce individual district candidates alongside a 
party list. As the literature shows, party leadership tends to become more central to selection and 
candidate list placement as district magnitude increases.35 Thus, it is likely that grassroots 
organizations will be able to exert more influence on selection for single-member district 
candidates than for proportional representation candidates.  
MMPs create distinct incentives for the party’s top leadership, predisposing it toward the 
selection of different types of candidates. In single-member districts, the key for electoral 
success is the candidate’s personal reputation and support within the district, which leads to three 
possible scenarios. First, a candidate that emerges with strong backing from grassroots 
organizations can be accepted by the leadership to increase the probability of getting out the 
vote. Second, if there are strong organizations but contested nominations, the leadership can 
provide arbitration to maximize the chance of electoral success. In these cases, the leadership can 
maximize success by choosing a candidate who is most acceptable to a majority of local 
organizations. Third, where there are few social organizations linked to the party or where these 
are weakly organized, the central leadership can use nominations to build alliances with existing 
organizations or to attract the support of specific social sectors. However, for proportional 
representation candidates the key to electoral success is the overall strength of the party ticket. 
Parties often use these candidacies to diversify their lists and attract maximum electoral support.  
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Recent studies also highlight the relevance of the organizational strength of party 
subunits for party outcomes.36 In addition to mobilizing supporters and delivering votes, a strong 
local party organization can play a role in the aggregation of political interests, such as in the 
selection of candidates. It can either nominate candidates directly, or serve as an arena for 
resolving conflicts among competing groups. However, variance in the organizational strength of 
party subunits does not fully explain variation in candidate selection patterns. This article shows 
that a party’s top leadership can serve as an arbiter in chief in conflicts where the local party 
organization is either weak or strong, but the leadership more likely performs this role in 
contexts with a strong and heterogeneous civil society that is not fully aligned with the party. In 
other words, it is the failure of coordination among grassroots actors that, in general, creates an 
organizational opportunity for the party leadership to centralize power. This finding points to the 
importance of examining broader structural elements associated with the strength of civil society, 
and more broadly, with the organizational contexts in which parties are embedded.  
 
Structural Elements 
Structural factors associated with the strength of civil society are central to my 
explanation. Classic works in political sociology, as well as more recent empirical research on 
party building, have established that densely organized civil societies can serve as a potential 
power base for parties.37 The expectation is that the organizational infrastructures of politically 
oriented associations may contribute to building strong parties by reducing costs and 
coordination problems. This “organizational inheritance” – as Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 
argue – can provide invaluable resources to new political parties and contribute to their long-
term empowerment. New parties are more likely to take root, and also to persist over time, where 
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politicians build upon the infrastructure of pre-existing organizations. MBPs, even if initially 
loosely organized, are well positioned to build strong parties.  
Following these insights, a significant factor affecting the internal governance of parties 
and their tendencies toward oligarchization is the variation in the organizational strength of their 
civil society allies. Specifically, I argue that the presence of civil societies that are both (1) 
strongly organized and (2) united, can generate politically consequential pressures from below.38 
Strongly organized civil societies are those with high organizational density (percentage of the 
district’s population that are members of grassroots organizations). United means affinity of 
purpose – the ability to privilege common purpose over narrow organizational interests in order 
to agree on decisions affecting common interests.  
At least four combinations of party-civil society are possible: (1) strong civil society 
aligned with the party, (2) strong civil society aligned with opposition parties, (3) strong civil 
society with different political alignments, and (4) weak civil society (in which case political 
alignments are less relevant). 39   
Systematic evidence from candidate selection within a movement-based party 
demonstrates that oligarchic decision-making by the party leadership is less likely to take place 
in districts where grassroots organizations aligned with the party are strongly organized, have 
mechanisms to arrive at decisions, and can agree on selection. In turn, in contexts where strong 
grassroots organizations aligned with the party are absent, or where they are strong but have 
multiple alignments and do not agree on selection, oligarchic decision-making in the hands of a 
small party elite is much more likely to occur. Similarly, contexts of weak civil society create 
organizational opportunities for power concentration in the hands of a few. Thus, the evidence 
highlights the importance of both the strength of civil society organizations and political 
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alignments of civil society on candidate selection outcomes. These findings are consistent with 
recent developments in the social movement literature inspired by the organizational ecology 
tradition.40 
Though not yet connected to the literature on political parties, organizational ecologists 
emphasize the broader organizational field in which parties operate.41 Similarly, the findings 
from the Bolivia case suggest that a potentially rewarding area for further research on the 
internal dynamics of political parties is the relevant contextual conditions, such as the impact of 
diverging patterns of party-civil society relations. Just as parties deploy different linkage 
strategies to attract different electoral constituencies in unequal societies,42 their local operations 
vary according to the way political space is structured.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
MAS is a particularly relevant case for studying MBPs because it deviates from the 
conventional wisdom.43 Although there are observable tendencies towards power concentration, 
grassroots groups have retained considerable “bottom up” influence in processes of candidate 
selection in districts where civil society is strong, has mechanisms to arrive at decisions, and can 
agree on selection.44 The result has been salient variation in candidate selection outcomes across 
different geographical constituencies. 
Existing empirical studies offer important insights on how MAS selects candidates; 
however, they are generally descriptive and leave critical questions unanswered.45 Specifically, 
although they acknowledge variation within MAS and provide a wealth of qualitative 
information, they fail to explain what the main sources of that variation actually are. 
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My empirical analysis addresses this issue. It examines subnational variation in the 
selection of candidates for national office in the electoral process leading to the 2009 election. 
This is a key moment because MAS was in its most expansive phase, and as a result, the lead up 
to that election can be conceived of as a likely scenario for high degrees of power concentration. 
I rely on evidence collected through interviews with over fifty MAS representatives from the 
districts of La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, and Santa Cruz (see Table 1),46 in addition to 120 
interviews with key informants. Interviewees included leaders of allied grassroots organizations, 
non-elected regional party brokers, unsuccessful aspirants, members of the executive branch, 
representatives of opposition parties, experts, journalists, as well as candidates nominated for 
local office in rural and urban districts.47 Data from these interviews are supplemented by a close 
reading of newspapers on the process and its aftermath, and of the existing secondary literature. 
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
My analysis reveals tremendous variation across different localities. Conditions where 
organizations allied to MAS have a near monopoly of organization are more likely to be 
observed in the rural areas in Bolivia’s western departments, including La Paz, Cochabamba, and 
Oruro, where single-member district candidates are more likely to emerge from social 
organizations and be accepted by the party leadership. This pattern of candidate selection reflects 
a de facto diffusion of power, in that it mirrors the balance of power between MAS and 
territorially grounded grassroots organizations, and also between these organizations themselves. 
Bolivia is no exception to the rule that urban areas are generally more heterogeneous than 
rural areas. In some cities or urban districts the diffusion of power among organizations leads to 
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a situation where agreement on candidates is difficult, while in other cases the organizational 
density (i.e. the presence and strength of organizations aligned with MAS) is significantly lower. 
In both types of situations, the candidate selection process exhibits a combination of oligarchic 
decision-making with grassroots participation and consensus building. Specifically, where there 
are strong organizations but no consensus among them, the leadership is likely to choose a 
candidate acceptable to a majority of local organizations; where organizations are weak, 
however, the leadership is likely to select candidates that will help to build alliances with 
existing organizations or to attract support from particular groups that may increase electoral 
returns. These patterns are similar to that observed for most proportional representation 
candidates. Finally, in Bolivia’s eastern departments, which represent new arenas of competition 
for MAS, the social organizations linked to the party are weak. In the absence of strong 
organizations that can agree on candidate selection, elite decision-making is more likely to 
occur.48  
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING 
 
Bolivia’s bicameral Congress consists of a Chamber of Senators with 36 seats, and a 
Chamber of Deputies with 130 seats. All elected representatives serve five-year terms, and re-
election is permitted. Members of the Chamber of Senators are elected through closed-list 
proportional representation. Deputies are elected by a mixed-member proportional (MMP) 
electoral system that has created two different types of seats, “plurinominal” (proportional 
representation) and “uninominal” (single-member district -- SMD), forcing parties to produce 
individual district candidates alongside a party list. In addition, the country’s 2009 constitution 
established seven “special” seats for ethnic minorities. Seventy uninominal representatives are 
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elected by plurality vote in single-member districts, fifty-three plurinominal representatives are 
elected in a closed-list proportional representation system, and the seven special representatives 
are elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies.49 
 
UNINOMINAL CANDIDATES 
Generally, in selecting uninominal candidates, MAS delegates responsibilities and 
control to the grassroots organizations that are present in a given electoral district. In these cases, 
then, candidates emerge based on the strength of the social organization they represent. Prior to 
an election, the MAS National Directorate requests nominations from allied grassroots 
organizations throughout the country. These organizations are then in charge of conducting 
screening, pre-selection, and candidate nomination processes, and they do so by electoral district 
and according to the norms and procedures they themselves deem adequate. In most cases, the 
MAS leadership respects the decisions by grassroots organizations.50 
Formal membership in MAS is not a condition for candidacy. Instead, “aspiring 
candidates need to be approved by the people in their territory.”51 The only hard-and-fast rule 
that MAS respects is that each district has to ensure rigorous gender equality: by statute, if the 
titular candidate for a district is a man, the substitute needs to be a woman and vice-versa. 
Although there is no rule stipulating that uninominal candidates must have experience as a leader 
of a grassroots organization, this is almost always the case. As a former deputy commented, “it is 
practically impossible to become a uninominal candidate for MAS if you do not have experience 
as a [social organization] leader.”52 Interviews with multiple uninominal representatives in La 
Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, and Santa Cruz, confirm this observation. Analyses based on the 
 15 
survey of Latin American parliamentary elites conducted by the University of Salamanca show 
that most of them, indeed, came from a grassroots organization.53 
The key actors are grassroots organizations with a territorial base. These gained legal 
status as Territorial Grassroots Organizations (OTBs) with the 1994 Law of Popular 
Participation, and they generally include neighborhood associations, traditional indigenous 
organizations (the ayllus), and modern peasant unions (the sindicatos campesinos). Candidate 
selection within MAS ensures the representation of the OTBs that decide to join the party.54  
Below I examine subnational variation in the nomination of uninominal candidates 
according to the four party-civil society constellations outlined above. 
 
Strong Civil Society Aligned with MAS 
Where civil society is strongly organized and aligned with MAS, as in the western 
departments of La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, and Potosí, decentralized participation tends to be 
the norm. The process begins at the lowest organizational level of the union structure, the 
sindicatos campesinos, and then moves up to the territory’s higher organizational levels, the 
subcentrales and the centrales.55 In general, the subcentral aligns with the territory of the 
electoral district, meaning that there is generally one subcentral per electoral district. The 
following account portrays an “ideal typical” model through which MAS selects uninominal 
candidates.  
The selectorate for such candidacies is highly inclusive, and there is a clear emphasis on 
extending grassroots participation. As Vice President Álvaro García Linera commented in an 
interview, because “these candidates are not handpicked, they are not the candidates of the party 
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in a strict sense. They are selected by grassroots organizations as a function of their territorial 
power, and they are the representatives of those organizations.”56  
Selection can be summarized in three steps. First, each sindicato and other OTBs in a 
given district organize meetings to conduct a preliminary screening of potential candidates and 
then select their nominees. These meetings, called ampliados or cabildos, are crowded events 
that ensure broad grassroots participation. The individuals who are elected at this level then 
represent their organization at the next highest level of organization, the subcentrales. At this 
level, each subcentral holds an ampliado or a cabildo to choose among the sindicato-level 
nominees. The winner of each subcentral contest then goes on to compete for representation at 
the next highest level of organization, the central. The candidates for each electoral district are 
defined at this level, as seen below. 
Finally, the central organizes an ampliado or a cabildo with all of the nominees presented 
by the subcentrales. The winners at this level typically emerge as uninominal candidates if they 
receive the support of all the organizations involved throughout the process. The runners-up 
serve as substitute candidates for the district. 
 
Strong Civil Society Aligned with Opposition 
The expansion to the east, where MAS was historically weak, pushed decision-making 
structures into a more oligarchic direction.57 In parts of Santa Cruz, particularly in rural districts, 
the selection of uninominal candidates followed the familiar “bottom up” pattern described 
above; in contrast, in the city of Santa Cruz, where there are strong organizations aligned with 
opposition forces, a local party structure played an influential role and nominated several 
candidates from its ranks.58 However, department level selection also involved alliance and 
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coalition building with other parties, with politically influential groups and non-traditional 
organizations, and with a wide array of ad hoc urban organizations. Such alliances guaranteed 
representation for members of those groups, and were made by the national leadership; neither 
the local party, nor the grassroots organizations that control the Regional Directorate, created 
them.59 The composition of the electoral list reflected an internal balance of power that favored 
those urban groups over peasant organizations, reflecting a more centralized and exclusive 
selection pattern that strengthened the influence of a small party elite.60 It also revealed a strong 
pragmatism by the top party leadership. Evidence from other eastern departments, where major 
civil society organizations are aligned with the opposition, reveals a similar pattern of candidate 
selection that combines participation from below with oligarchic decision-making. 
 
Strong Civil Society with Multiple Alignments 
The fact that MAS has grown fast and in a decentralized manner has allowed newly 
incorporated local organizations significant influence on candidate selection. Generally, their 
decision to be a part of MAS implies mutual benefits. MAS opens its electoral lists and gives 
these organizations control over the selection process. Thus, MAS benefits from the social 
networks and organizational infrastructure of these organizations, which are able to organize 
campaigns and mobilize resources more efficiently. In turn, grassroots organizations benefit 
from the association with MAS, which generally increases their likelihood of electoral success. 
 This symbiotic relationship is different in rural and urban environments, however. 
Grassroots organizations with a territorial base are central to selection in both settings, but in 
urban areas there are usually no clearly identifiable organizations that exert dominance over the 
territory. Rather, there is a multiplicity of neighborhood associations, professional associations, 
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cooperatives, unions and the like. Since they usually are in competition during the selection 
process, these competing organizations often have difficulty agreeing on a preferred candidate. 
When conflicts arise and competing organizations cannot reach agreement, a small party elite 
that often includes the president himself acts as an arbiter and has the last word. As I describe 
further below, the failures of coordination among grassroots actors create an organizational space 
for the leadership to centralize power, pushing internal decision-making structures into a more 
oligarchic direction.   
 
Weak Civil Society 
In rural areas, particularly where grassroots organizations have dominant control over the 
territory, MAS has not invested much in the building of a party branch independent of these 
organizations. 61  In urban areas, by contrast, and particularly in places where grassroots 
organizations are not strong, or where they do not have dominant control over the territory, MAS 
has constructed territorial party organizations of varying strength. For the most part, however, 
these structures lack independent decision-making power, creating an organizational opportunity 
for the party leadership to centralize power in contexts where civil society is weak.  
 
Summary 
Systematic evidence from the departments of La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, and Santa 
Cruz, complemented by observations of other departments, suggests that the crucial variable 
determining the nature of candidate selection is the strength of civil society – both number of 
members and the ability of grassroots organizations to reach an agreement on selection. In this 
scenario, MAS diffuses power among territorially grounded grassroots actors, which generally 
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have the last word on selection. Once these organizations nominate a candidate, this person 
becomes a candidate for MAS. However, when conflicts emerge among competing 
organizations, MAS tends to concentrate decision-making power in the hands of a small party 
elite – and even Morales himself. These disputes are rarely resolved through formal channels, or 
by the local party organization. These dynamics are more commonly observed in urban areas, 
where the political space is more fragmented, and in the eastern departments, where MAS 
expanded by means of a “catch-all” strategy of recruitment. 
 
PLURINONMINAL CANDIDATES 
Districts for plurinominal candidates are larger, meaning that there are different party-
civil society constellations within each district. It also means that coordination among competing 
organizations is generally more complicated than in uninominal districts. Conflicts among such 
organizations create an organizational opportunity for the party leadership to centralize power.  
Indeed, plurinominal candidates and candidate list placement typically emerge from 
agreements between the leadership of MAS and specific social sectors, or are directly selected by 
Morales. These candidacies help to generate balances – territorial, corporate, urban/rural, and 
male/female – after the list of uninominal candidates is approved.62 In this instance the selection 
process is more centralized; the principal actors are either national party leaders, members of the 
national-level government, or brokers with access to patronage resources in departmental 
governments, and ultimately Evo Morales himself.  
Although the selection of plurinominal candidates is more centralized and exclusive, and 
therefore more oligarchic, it serves as a part of a deliberate strategy of addition that allows for 
the incorporation of sectors and groups that do not have a territorial or an institutional corporate 
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base. As Leonida Zurita commented, “the idea is to include everyone – that is, professionals, 
non-professionals, intellectuals, non-intellectuals, indigenous and nonindigenous middle class, 
women, and so on. It is in that sense that our project is one of inclusion and not of exclusion.” 
This view is akin to the view of Concepción Ortiz, MAS’s Vice President, who stated that this 
mechanism allows MAS to balance its electoral lists, and is seen by the leadership as an 
inclusionary way to give representation to urban middle classes.63  
Formal membership and a background as a movement leader are not conditions for 
candidacy. As a result, rural and peasant organizations generally view plurinominal candidates 
without such a background as unwelcome competitors. They consider themselves the authentic 
representatives of MAS. Indeed, plurinominal candidates are often referred to as “invited.” That 
characterization is used to contrast “organic” rural-based rank and file with “invited” urban and 
middle classes.  
This form of nomination was not widespread during the early days of MAS. Rather, as 
Do Alto and Stefanoni suggest, the invitation of candidates only became common during the 
2002 election, when MAS became a national-level actor.64  MAS developed an expansive 
strategy of electoral recruitment and coalition building in order to compete successfully for the 
presidency and congress. The idea behind this strategic maneuver was initially simple: to recruit 
indigenous and nonindigenous middle classes, left-leaning and nationalist intellectuals, social 
movement leaders, and professionals, among others, in order to expand the electoral base.  
The strategy of invitation has changed over time, however, and it has served as a 
mechanism of accommodation that gives MAS flexibility in changing electoral and political 
environments. It has also been useful once the party assumed power. According to Bolivian 
journalist Fernando Molina, once MAS gained power, the growing presence of “invited” 
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candidates has responded to two factors: “first, the need to improve the efficiency of the new 
regime, and second, the co-optation of the ‘process of change’ by bureaucratic and intellectual 
classes.”65 Molina’s account assumes that MAS of necessity has adapted to, and has been 
absorbed by, the state apparatus, and that “invited” candidates are just a reflection of those 
dynamics. However, while there are oligarchic tendencies within the legislative group, and while 
these have intensified after MAS assumed power, Molina’s conclusion can be misleading. It is 
possible that “invited” MAS candidates and social movement representatives do not form any 
sort of organic group with shared or corporate social and political interests and incentives – that 
is, they do not form an oligarchy. At best, they represent a temporary group of assorted 
representatives from diverse base organizations in a loose coalition.  
Molina’s functionalism also downplays the choices and power struggles within the party 
and the diverse selection mechanisms used by MAS. According to Jorge Silva, the leading 
campaign advisor for the 2009 election, it is important to make an analytic distinction between 
plurinominal candidates invited directly by Morales, and those candidates nominated by social 
organizations. Most of the former are invited because they are considered “symbolic figures or 
political emblems that can give certain vitality to the government. In these cases, the selection 
decision does not come out from the social organizations but rather from the top down.”66 In 
other words, the source of legitimacy for these candidates comes from their accumulated 
symbolic capital. The rationale behind these nominations is to capture the median voter.67 
The analysis provided thus far characterizes the selectorate as highly exclusive. It is 
therefore possible to argue that the nomination process of plurinominal candidates within MAS 
resembles an “appointment system,” but that would be an oversimplification.68  
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My research shows that many plurinominal candidates are nominated by a wide array of 
social movements, unions, and civic associations that, among other base organizations, compete 
for representation. As in the case of the uninominal candidates, prior to an election cycle MAS’s 
National Directorate distributes an open call for nominations to sponsoring and allied 
organizations throughout the country. After the invitation is out, the social organizations allied to 
MAS – or those that intend to join and nominate candidates – propose their preferred candidates. 
According to Jorge Silva, since these nominees are “neither members nor activists of the social 
organization nor formal members of MAS, it is only in this sense that we can say they are 
invited. It is not the president who brings them or imposes them on the organizations, but rather 
the organizations actually make the invitations.”69  
In these cases, then, the power struggles among competing organizations to nominate 
their own candidates, and the way in which conflicts emerging from these struggles are resolved, 
are central to selection. To increase the likelihood of nominating their preferred candidates, 
competing organizations need to coordinate with other groups. Coordination is not always easy, 
however. 
An example of the selection of senatorial candidates from the Department of 
Cochabamba will illustrate how the selection of plurinominal candidates works. Of the list of 
four senators, the first slot went to Adolfo Mendoza, who had served as a legal and political 
advisor to peasant organizations during the constituent assembly; the second slot went to 
Marcelina Chávez, who is both a miner in a cooperative and a peasant union leader; the third slot 
went to Julio Salazar, who was a prominent coca-growing union-leader in the Six Federations of 
the Tropic of Cochabamba in the Chapare region; and the fourth slot went to Lidia Ordónez, who 
was loosely associated to the “middle” class.70  
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Mendoza explains why he obtained the first slot:  
 
[W]e knew that we were going to win at least two seats, but not the four seats in 
the Department. The Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba wanted the 
first seat for themselves, but that would have been a risky move, electorally 
speaking. […] Since the Bartolinas and the Six Federations did not come to an 
agreement […], they decided to invite me because they knew me by my work in 
the constituent assembly. I was also a visible person nation-wide, as I had led a 
public campaign to defend the constitution in Cochabamba before it was 
approved, and as a result they thought that my candidacy would secure urban 
middle-class votes and increase the probabilities of winning, if not four seats, at 
least the first three. I was someone associated with the construction of the 
Plurinational State, but people knew I wasn’t in MAS. In fact, I didn’t become a 
candidate because I was a member of MAS, or even a leader of a social 
organization, but thanks to my collaboration with these. And it wasn’t Morales 
who invited me, but rather these organizations.71 
 
Failures of Coordination  
Even in the case of uninominal candidates, competing social organizations often do not 
reach a consensus in the selection process, failing to nominate candidates. To date, there are 
neither clear hierarchies nor clearly established formal structures and mechanisms to resolve 
these conflicts within MAS. The Regional Directorates, as intermediate-level party bodies, may 
play an important role in this regard. However, just like the local party apparatus, they do not 
have sufficient autonomy and decision-making power, and they try “not to obstruct the decisions 
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made by the executive or by the social organizations themselves.”72 In the absence of clear 
mechanisms for conflict resolution, most participants end up relying on Morales to decide. He 
plays the role of arbiter in chief, particularly in areas where the political apparatus is weaker 
(e.g., in Beni, Pando, and Tarija). In cases where MAS has developed a stronger party apparatus 
(e.g., in Cochabamba, La Paz, and Santa Cruz), conflicts are resolved by the intervention of local 
powerful political actors who exert significant influence on intraparty decisions, but also by 
Morales himself.  
When it comes to plurinominal candidates, ad hoc committees composed by a small 
group of influential leaders are often formed to decide the final composition of the electoral lists. 
While this is an ad hoc arrangement, interviews with plurinominal candidates suggest that this 
group typically includes the President, the Vice President, the Presidents of Congress, leaders of 
MAS’s National Directorate, and leaders from the MAS’s core organizations. Additional leaders 
sometimes are included. These groups evaluate the lists proposed by social organizations in each 
department, and then negotiate with these organizations to determine which individuals will be 
selected.  
These groups can also veto candidates already proposed. Their ability to do so, however, 
is contingent on structural elements. Two examples with differences in structural context may 
help illustrate this point. The first is in Santa Cruz, where civil society is strong and aligned with 
opposition forces. In such a context, vetoes from the top succeeded when regional organizations 
engaged in an alliance with the Unión Juvenil Cruceñista (UJC), a right-wing shock troop that 
had violent confrontations with MAS activists during the first Morales government. This alliance 
would guarantee the UJC an important number of seats, which the leadership did not accept. In 
other cases, however, despite the veto attempts by committees, social organizations manage to 
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nominate their preferred candidate. Generally, this occurs where strong grassroots organizations 
are aligned with MAS, as in the Department of Cochabamba.  
 
Summary 
The selection of plurinominal candidates is more centralized and exclusive than that of 
uninominal candidates. The process can be characterized as a combination of top-down decision-
making by a small – but varying – group of influential leaders, and negotiation and consensus 
building from below. While in some cases the leadership can exert significant influence on the 
order and composition of the lists, in other instances the social organizations have more power to 
nominate their preferred candidate. Consistent with the main argument here, this is generally the 
case in areas where social organizations are stronger and aligned with MAS. When this is not the 
case, the leadership has more control over candidate selection.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The rising popularity and ascent to power of movement-based parties (MBPs) is a rapidly 
spreading phenomenon. This development calls for a new theoretical understanding of their 
internal politics, one that helps us move beyond the caricature of an inevitable “iron law” toward 
a more nuanced understanding of new and, arguably, more participatory forms of organization. 
Using original empirical evidence on how the Bolivian MAS selects candidates, I have explained 
the conditions and mechanisms under which broad and substantive grassroots participation can 
be promoted in contemporary governing parties formed by social movements. Where civil 
society is strong, has mechanisms to arrive at collective decisions, and can reach agreements on 
candidate selection, it can play an important role in defying the oligarchization of allied MBPs 
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by maintaining open political spaces for democratic participation from below. This is particularly 
the case for uninominal candidates. Thus, electoral rules create the space for social movements to 
shape the process.  
This analysis has implications for understanding internal sources of party variance. Just 
as parties deploy multiple strategies to attract different electoral constituencies, they also operate 
differently in different settings depending on how the political space is structured. I have shown 
that variation in patterns of party-civil society relations shape the internal life of parties. The 
evidence and analysis suggest that internal party processes should not be seen as a mere 
reflection of formal institutional rules governing a country. While these are important and are 
manifested, for example, in electoral rules, they do not fully explain sources of variation within 
MBPs, nor between them.73 To understand how parties operate, then, it is crucial to examine the 
organizational context in which they are embedded, and how this varies geographically.  
What significance does this argument have for Latin American politics? The era of party 
building in the region is far from over. Over the last two decades, new parties representing the 
interests of those historically marginalized have emerged and risen to power in the region. Some 
of these parties combine charismatic leadership with a grassroots movement base, like MAS, the 
Brazilian PT, and the Uruguayan FA. A central goal for these parties in power has been to 
construct more participatory modes of democratic governance. However, sustaining participation 
is challenging when governing at the national level. While some leaders in power have 
transformed their parties into personalistic vehicles, as in the cases of Venezuela and Ecuador, 
the analysis presented in this article reveals a different, and arguably more promising, bottom-up 
pattern of participation. At least in the realm of candidate selection, organized popular 
constituencies can, under certain conditions, limit the power and autonomy of the party 
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leadership, and exert decision-making power. Their influence over selection outcomes has been 
consequential in Bolivia’s political process: it has led to large-scale participation by individuals 
and previously under-represented groups at the highest level of representation in the country;74 
their participation in Congress has contributed to diversifying the legislative agenda, making 
their interests increasingly harder to be ignored.75 
Thus, in addition to conceiving of MBPs simply as electoral vehicles, we should theorize 
about them as promising instruments for the successful incorporation into politics of historically 
marginalized popular groups. This conclusion speaks to the potential consequences of social 
movements at the structural level, marking the achievement of lasting influence and shaping 
options for excluded groups to gain representation in organized politics. To understand new 
patterns of representation and incorporation in young democracies, which are occurring through 
more fluid structures than in the past, we need more research on the internal life of MBPs.  
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